WHY SPARKY CAN'T BARK - A STUDY OF THE BAN
ON BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS FOR LOTTERIES
John Crigler, John Wells King and Amelia L. Brown*

Section 1304 of the U.S. Criminal Code prohibits
the broadcast of any "advertisement of or any information concerning any lottery." 1 The law that has
developed under the statute falls into one of two
completely different contexts. One context-that of
regulatory enforcement-is circumscribed, literalistic, and punitive. It is concerned with forbidden
words and phrases, concrete factual contexts, strict
linguistic constructions, and the assessment of monetary forfeitures. The other context-that of judicial
challenges to the constitutional validity of the advertising ban-is expansive, abstract and theoretical. It
is concerned with general principles of First Amendment law, the relationship between state and federal
policies, and questions of degree, such as the "substantiality" of government interests and the appropriateness of restrictions on protected speech. This
Article is an attempt to bring these two contexts together, to set them in a broader historical perspective, and to examine critically the issues now under

consideration in the pending challenge to the advertising ban.

* John Crigler and John Wells King are partners, and
Amelia L. Brown is an associate, in the law firm of Haley,
Bader & Potts. The firm filed an amicus brief in Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, No. 93-16191 (9th Cir. 1993), in
support of the challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1304.
1 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), amended by
the Charity Games Advertising Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100625, § 3(a)(4), 102 Stat. 3206 (1988). The statute provides:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television
station for which a license is required by any law of the
United States, or whoever, operating any such station,
knowingly permits the broadcasting of any advertisement
of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise or
similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in
part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or
awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise or
scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such
prizes, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both. Each day's broadcasting
shall constitute a separate offense.
Id.
, Id. The Supreme Court defined "lottery," for purposes of
section 1304, as "a scheme in which tickets are sold and prizes
are awarded among the ticket holders by lot." FCC v. American

Broadcasting Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284, 290 n.8 (1954) (citing
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880)). The Court later distinguished a "gift enterprise" as a scheme that involves "the
purchase of merchandise or other property; the purchaser receives, in addition to the merchandise or other property, a 'free'
chance in a drawing." Id. (citing Homer v. United States, 147

I.

THE FCC'S ENFORCEMENT OF 18 U.S.C.

§ 1304
The Bonanza Casino in Reno, Nevada, sponsored
a series of advertisements featuring canine mascots
Reno and son Sparky. Unlike other commercial mascots, Reno and Sparky did not advertise their
master's principal line of business. They promoted
everything but gambling: the casino's food service, its
friendly atmosphere, its location and the adjoining
hotel.
The dogs were muzzled by the federal statute that
prohibits the broadcast on U.S. radio and television
of any information about "any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme."" The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission"),
which enforces compliance with the law,8 has inter-

U.S. 449 (1893)).
8 Implementing the statute, section 73.1211 of the FCC's
regulations provides:
(a) No licensee of an AM, FM or television broadcast
station, except as in paragraph (c) of this section, shall
broadcast any advertisement of or information concerning
any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering
prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance,
or any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of
any such lottery, gift enterprise or scheme, whether said
list contains any part or all of such prizes (18 U.S.C.
§ 1304, 62 Stat. 763).
(b) The determination whether a particular program
comes within the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section depends on the facts of each case. However, the Commission will in any event consider that a program comes
within the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section if in
connection with such program a prize consisting of money
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preted the term "lottery" to include casino gambling." The FCC reasoned that "gaming activities of
gambling casinos contain the"three elements of a lottery; that is, prize, consideration and chance."'
The Commission has acknowledged that the
meanings of "gambling activities" and "lotteries"
may differ. For example, although pari-mutuel betting on horse racing is a gambling activity, the FCC
does not treat it as a lottery because it presumes that
the element of chance is not present."
The FCC's strict interpretation of what comprises
"information about" a lottery is reflected in a series
of orders, public notices, and declaratory rulings,
many of which are unpublished letters.7 They challenge the promotional ingenuity of those to whom
the anti-lottery statute is directed. The Commission's
stance on the use of the word "casino" in commercial

advertisements is illustrative. The FCC has condemned the utterance of "casino" as a generic noun,
such as "[t]his is what you've been waiting for: a hotel/casino that loves to party," 8 or -as an adjective,
such as "Sam's Town has two floors of casino excitement." 9 In one creative commercial, the forbidden
word was reflected in the casino's swimming pool as
an announcer says "come play on the island." 10 The
FCC concluded that the juxtaposition of the .video
and audio portions of the commercial created an
"overall impression" that the advertisement promotes
the gambling activities of the casino."
In Reno and Sparky's case, the offending word
"casino" appeared on screen for a few seconds, in a
context entirely incidental to the main thrust of the
commercial.' Sparky and Reno were filmed in the
front seat of a red Cadillac used by the casinos for

or other thing of value is awarded to any person whose

zation that would qualify as tax exempt under section 501
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
47 C.F.R. § 73.1211 (1992). A similar regulation applies to
origination cablecasting by cable television systems. 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.213 (1992). "Origination cablecasting" is programming
that is subject to the exclusive control of a cable operator, 47
C.F.R. § 76.5(P) (1992), as distinguished from programming
originated on public, governmental, and educational access channels. The FCC staff holds the view that the lottery ban applies
to origination cablecasting, but does not apply to material carried on leased public access channels. Letter from Edythe Wise,
Chief, Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enf. Div., MM,
FCC, to Joel K. Schwartz, Regional Manager, Cable Ad Net
(Feb. 25, 1987) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus). A cable
operator is prohibited from exercising control over such channels. 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (1988).
'
Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC, to Alan Campbell, Dow,
Lohnes & Albertson (Sept. 18, 1985) (on file with CommLaw
Conspectus) [hereinafter Letter from Edythe Wise to Alan
Campbell].
Id.
Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC, to Robert J. Robinson,
Administrator, State of Montana Dept. of Justice, Gambling
Control Division (Aug. 16, 1992) (on file with CommLaw
Conspectus).

selection is dependent in whole or in part upon lot or
chance, if as a condition of winning or competing for such
prize, such winner or winners are required to furnish any
money or other thing of value or are required to have in
their possession any product sold, manufactured, furnished or distributed by a sponsor of a program broadcast
on the station in question (See 21 F.C.C.2d 846 (1970)).
(c) The provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section shall not apply to an advertisement, list of prizes or
other information concerning:
(1) A lottery conducted by a State acting under the au-

thority of State law which is broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location in that State or any
other State which conducts such a lottery. (18 U.S.C.
§ 1307(a); 102 Stat. 3205).
(2) Fishing contests exempted under 18 U.S. Code 1305
(not conducted for profit, i.e., all receipts fully consumed

in defraying the actual costs of operation).
(3) Any gaming conducted by an Indian Tribe pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C.
§ 2701 et seq).
(4) A lottery, gift enterprise or similar scheme, other
than one described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, that
is authorized or not otherwise prohibited by the State in

which it is conducted and which is:
(i) Conducted by a not-for-profit organization or a governmental organization (18 U.S.C § 1307(a); 102 Stat.

3205); or
(ii) Conducted as a promotional activity by a commercial organization and is clearly occasional and ancillary to
the primary business of that organization (18 U.S.C.
§ 1307(a); 102 Stat. 3205).
(d)(1) For purposes of paragraph (c) of this section,
"lottery" means the pooling of proceeds derived from the
sale of tickets or chances and allotting those proceeds or
parts thereof by chance to one or more chance takers or
ticket purchasers. It does not include the placing or ac-

cepting of bets or wagers on sporting events or contests.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (c)(4)(i) of this section,
the term "not-for-profit organization" means any organi-

See, e.g., infra notes 8-11.
Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to Calnevar

Broadcasting, Inc., 8 FCC Rcd. 32 (1992).
9 Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to Channel 33,

Inc., 7 FCC Rcd. 3224 (1992) [hereinafter Letter from Roy J.
Stewart to Channel 33].
,0 Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC to J. Dominic Monahan,
(Apr. 21, 1986) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus) [hereinafter Letter from Edythe Wise to J. Dominic Monahan].
Ild.
"
Here is a transcript of one of the Bonanza Casino advertisements, entitled "Rodeo Cowboys":
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promotional appearances at parades and at rodeos.
On the side of the car were painted the words, "Bonanza Casino, Live Entertainment - 4720 N. Virginia St. - The Friendliest Casino in Reno, NV."
The second occurrence of the word "casino" resulted
in the assessment of a $12,500 forfeiture."
The FCC, however, does not forbid use of the
word "casino" when used as the proper name of the
commercial sponsor. The Commission reasons that
"[tlhe word 'casino' is promotional of a lottery and
may be used in a broadcast only when the word is
part of a legal
name of a multi-purpose
14
establishment."

The "multi-purpose establishment" criterion
sprang from the FCC's observation that unless a casino has bona fide non-gaming activities to advertise,
any advertisement would directly promote a lottery.15 The FCC went on to express concern that
promotion of a casino's non-gaming activities "not be
used as a sham to promote the gaming activities,"1 6
and obliquely offered a standard of proof to establish
the legitimacy of a casino's restaurant operations:
[Aidvertisers or their counsel have occasionally furnished

information concerning, for example: (1) annual restaurant revenues; (2) square footage; (3) design and location
of the restaurant (i.e., whether it is located on the same
premises and has a separate entrance from that of the casino); and (4) whether the restaurant is a full service one
serving three meals daily and is patronized primarily for
its own sake rather than as a fast food bar to support the
gaming patrons."

The FCC also has focused on other elements that
in its view promote a lottery. The most obvious of
these is gambling paraphernalia." To state that a
commercial sponsor has "lots of liberal slots" violates
the anti-lottery statute.1 9 Even a commercial set in
an elevator can violate the statute: "visual and audio
effects created by the bells, pinball-like lights in the
elevator and sounds that are not dissimilar from that
of mechanical and electronic slot machines, enhance
the impression created by the dialogue [that one
could easily win at gambling there]." 20
Display of gambling paraphernalia, such as playing cards, a roulette wheel, and a craps table, are
not, by themselves, offensive when used in a television game show. However, a program producer who
proposed to employ such items in a Las Vegas set-

VIDEO:

AUDIO:

Cowboy #5:

Super over scene of six cowboys
sitting in front of stables:

Cowboy #1 with
guitar:
You know, I remember
the first time Reno
and I went to the
Bonanza to eat.
You know he put
away three of them
$3.99 rib dinners and
still had room for
dessert.
This is true.

Cut to stables Scene

I don't know, but he's
heading for the
Bonanza.

Slide: "Bonanza Casino
4720 N. Virginia St.
-Reno-"

Announcer:

"Meanwhile back at the ranch

. .

Cowboy #2:
You know, I've never
seen a dog ride a horse
any better.
Cowboy #3:
Yep, I hear he's going
to be in the rodeo
parade again this year.
Cut to red Cadillac convertible
driving by, beeping horn, Reno at
the wheel with two cowboys in front
and three sitting on top of rear seat,
tipping hats and waving. Lettering
on side of car: "Bonanza Casino.
Live Entertainment 4720 N.
Virginia St. . . . The Friendliest
Casino in Reno, NV . .. .

Cowboy #4:
Who was that masked
dog?

The Bonanza Casino.
The cowboy's home
away from home.
'
Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to DR Partners,
Licensee, KOLO-TV, 8 FCC Rcd. 44 (1992). ", Id. "If the word 'Casino' is not part of the~proper name of
a resort, depicting that word in the commercial would be an improper promotion of a lottery .... ." Letter from Edythe Wise,
Chief, Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enf. Div., MM,
FCC, to Rolla Cleaver, Esq., Vice President and General Counsel, Valley Broadcasting Co. (July 31, 1990) (on file with
CommLaw Conspectus).
" Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC, to J. Dominic Monahan,
(July 21, 1987) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus) [hereinafter Letter from Edythe Wise to J. Dominic Monahan].
1s

Id.

17

Id.

1s

Id.

's

Letter from Roy J. Stewart to Channel 33, supra note 9.

0

Letter from Edythe Wise to J. Dominic Monahan, supra

note 10.
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ting was informed that their use would run afoul of
the anti-lottery statute."1 The FCC observed:
[Tihe TV program will be taped live with an audience
from a showroom or ballroom of a Las Vegas hotel/casino
and the opening of the program will feature that location
with words such as "From the beautiful
hotel
and casino in Las Vegas, Nevada, it's time to play (title of
show)."'"

The FCC ruled that to connect the program with
"any identifiable Las Vegas hotel/casino would be
promoting the lotteries at those establishments" in
violation of the Commission's rules and the anti-lottery statute." Similarly, a proposed program called
"Casino Line," designed to educate the viewer on
the "theory, objectives, rules, and odds inherent in
various popular gambling games such as blackjack,
roulette, and craps," would, in the FCC's view, violate the anti-lottery statute if one of the hosts of the
program "is simultaneously employed by a legal
gambling enterprise (casino) ...to the degree that
the second host's association with the casino is identifiable.""' As to sponsorship of such a program, the
FCC concluded:
[S]ponsorship in whole or in part through spot advertising
by casino hotels or convention and visitor bureaus that are
normally underwritten by the local casino hotels would
raise a question whether the program is merely an attempt to advertise and/or promote the casino gaming activities of the sponsoring or associate casinos. 5

In the FOC's view, the lottery prohibition extends
to the slightest impression that broadcast material

promotes a particular lottery. Slogans, descriptive
phrases, and song lyrics that are susceptible of a
gambling interpretation are forbidden. Thus, the
FCC held that even though "play the favorite" is
susceptible of an innocent interpretation, it may
nonetheless promote lottery activity." Addressing the
licensee's contentions, the FCC found:
You state that the phrase, "The Palace Station, play the
favorite" does not refer to any particular gambling game
or to gambling in general, but, rather, to the fact that the
Palace Station won in ten different categories in the Las

", Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC, to Kenneth Yates, Yates
Entertainment Group (Aug. 5, 1991) (on file with CommLaw
Conspectus).
2s Id.
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Vegas Review Journal's poll, ranging from best seafood
restaurant to best slots. In the context of discussing the
poll to which you refer, the subject phrase could be interpreted as you say it should be. However, we find that the
phrase "The Palace Station, play the favorite," as broadcast in the subject commercial, promotes ongoing lottery7
activities at the Palace Station, despite your explanation.'

Activity that is described as "Vegas-style" is similarly suspect. The FCC found that the phrase
"Vegas-style games" violates the statute.26 However,
"Vegas-style excitement" was found to be acceptable
in commercials for activities that either are not lotteries or are gambling activities authorized under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.29 The FCC reasoned: "In the context of a multi-use establishment,
the phrase 'Vegas-style excitement' can fairly be
taken as a comprehensive reference to the entertainment, food and drink, decor, and other factors that
combine to create the ambiance popularly associated
with Las Vegas establishments." 8 0
Even if forbidden words, phrases, slogans, and
song lyrics are not used in a casino advertisement,
the FCC has looked to the "underlying purpose" of
a commercial to determine whether a lottery promotion is present. Commenting on a proposed advertisement called "Tour Bus," the FCC ruled:
[I]t is clear from such visual scenes as the Dunes hotel
sign, the bus route sign ["8 STRIP"] and the sign containing the numbers 77777, that the underlying purpose is
to promote a lottery. The bus does, in fact, arrive at the
Hilton where lottery activities are conducted. The dialogue adds further specific promotional value when it implies that, at the Hilton, a person may easily win the cost
of a mobile home merely by stopping in. There is no mention of other activities at the hotel to which the audio and
visual references may be reasonably related.81

The FCC functions as a kind of advertising review board, which applies its own arcane code to lottery ads, thus, advertisers like the Bonanza Casino
often produce commercials that discuss at length
such activities as food service, atmosphere and location; and purely by inference, suggest that the same
qualities of service exist with respect to the casino's
unmentionable primary business.
file with CommLaw Conspectus), enforced, 8 FCC Rcd. 46
(1992).
27

Id.

from Edythe Wise to Alan Campbell, supra note 4.

'8 In re Liability of WTMJ, Inc., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 4354, para. 4 (1993).
" Id.; See infra note 109 and accompanying text.

Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to Commonwealth Broadcasting of Northern California (July 29, 1992) (on

Letter from Edythe Wise to J. Dominic Monahan, supra
note 10.

28 Id.
"' Letter
25

2'

Id.

80
81

Id.
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II. HISTORY OF LOTTERY ADVERTISING
BAN AND EXCEPTIONS
A.

The Rise of Lottery Regulation

Lotteries were not always so strictly regulated.
The first lotteries in the United States were authorized by the British Crown as early as 1612, when
the Virginia Company of London was granted permission to conduct lotteries in the colonies. 2 The
Virginia lottery was considered respectable-"two of
the eight prizes [awarded] were won by church
parishes.""3
Thomas Jefferson sought permission from the
Virginia statehouse to operate a lottery in order to
raise funds to retire his debts.34 "State conducted lotteries prospered into the early years of the nineteenth century and played an important role in the
westward expansion of the nation."3 " Not only were
lotteries authorized to benefit insolvent debtors, but
lotteries also funded "all types of public works which
in later years would be financed by taxes or bond
issues.""
By the mid 1800s, when approximately $66.4 million in lottery revenue was being raised annually by
the eastern states, it was clear that lotteries could be
a major source of revenue for all the states.3" In
1812, congressional legislation authorized lotteries
00

See Ronald

J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social

Costs: A Historical Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling,
34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 25 & n.77 (1992) (discussing Virginia
Charter of 1612, § XVI) reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DocuMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 37, 44 (W. Swindler ed., 1979).
00
John Steele Gordon, Born of Iniquity, Running the Long
Lived Louisiana Lottery Was as Certain a Moneymaker as
Owning the Mint, AMERICAN HERITAGE MAGAZINE, Feb.Mar. 1994, at 14.
" Rychlak, supra note 32, at 30-31 n.124.
85 Id. at 31.
s Id.
37 See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

AND

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSIS-

TANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING: 1776 TO 1976, at 655-70

(1977).

so See G. Robert Blakey and Harold A. Kurland, The Development of the Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L.
REV. 923, 927-928 n.12 (1978) (referring to Act of May 4,
1812, ch. 75, § 6, 2 Stat. 721 (1812)).
00

See generally Rychlak, supra note 32, at 11-16.

See Blakey, supra note 38, at 927. See also Gordon, supra
note 33, at 14. "As early as 1812 Massachusetts authorized a
lottery to raise $16,000 to repair Plymouth Beach. Nine years
later, although 111,800 tickets had been sold and $886,439 had
been raised, only $9,876 had been turned over to repair the
beach. The rest had just melted away like a wave on the sand."
40

for the District of Columbia. 8 Generally speaking,
these state lotteries operated as state-sponsored lotteries operate today: tickets were sold, money collected, and prize winners were selected by chance.
The collected money funded the prize, the administrative costs of operating the lottery, and the cause
for which the lottery was held. 9
These highly successful lotteries were not without
scandal 0 or social repercussions.41 In response to
this perception of widespread corruption, Congress
limited the use of the mails for lottery purposes and
in 1827 passed legislation forbidding postmasters or
assistant postmasters from acting as agents for lottery
offices or vending lottery tickets.42 In addition, most
states acted to make lotteries illegal.43 In fact, by the
time the Civil War began, Missouri and Kentucky
alone had legal lotteries.4 4 Soon after the war ended
and while Louisiana was still under federal control,
the state legislature established a new lottery as one
writer described as "born of iniquity."4 5 By 1878,
Louisiana remained the only state authorizing a
lottery. 46
In 1868, Congress passed a law making it unlawful to "deposit in any post office, to be sent by mail,
any letters or circulars concerning lotteries, so-called
gift concerts, or other similar enterprises offering
Id.

The Librarian of Congress wrote in 1893 that public sentiment viewed lotteries as "among the most dangerous and prolific sources of human misery." A.R. Spofford, Lotteries in
American History, S. MIsc. DOC. No. 57, 52d Cong., 2d Sess.
195 (1893).
"' Act of March 2, 1827, ch. 61., § 6, 19th Cong., Sess. II, 4
Stat. 238, 239 (1827) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1303
(1988)).
43
Rychlak, supra note 32, at 37 n.163, referring to the following as examples of state laws: (1) Act of June 14, 1832, 1832
MICH. TERR. LAWS 15 (outlawing sale or advertising of private
lottery tickets); (2) MINN. TERR. REV. STAT., ch. 105, §§ 1-2
(1851) (prohibiting lotteries); (3) Act of Apr. 30, 1833, ch. 306,
1833 N.Y. LAWS 484 (similar); (4) Act of Dec. 23, 1830, GA.
LAWS 201 (taxing lotteries); (5) Act of Feb. 26, 1835, 1834 Mo.
LAWS 56 (requiring bond of lottery managers for previously authorized lotteries).
44
Gordon, supra note 33, at 14.
41

45

Id.

Rychlak, supra note 32, at 40. Louisiana chartered its lottery in 1868 for a twenty-five year term and reportedly the lottery paid out more than $3 million per year during its heyday.
Id. at 40-41. The Louisiana lottery was "required to make an
annual forty-thousand dollar payment to the Charity Hospital of
New Orleans, but was not otherwise taxed by the State."
Gordon, supra note 33, at 14-16. The lottery operators reportedly were very generous to victims of disaster (e.g., floods and
epidemics) as well. Id. at 16.
46
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When the postal laws were codified in 1872, the ban
against mailing lottery information was amended to
apply only to illegal lotteries.48 This revised statute
kept in place the ban on postal officials' acting as
agents for lotteries.' 9
The ban instituted in 1872 was limited to illegal
lotteries, thus, it did little to control state-sanctioned
lotteries. In 1876, Congress again amended the mail
statute. By deleting the word "illegal" from section
3894 of the revised statute, Congress made it a crime
to deposit any letters or circulars concerning lotteries
in the mail, regardless of the legality of the lottery.5 0
The prohibition on mailing lottery information
was challenged and upheld in Ex ParteJackson,"' in
which one Ireland Jackson was tried and convicted
for mailing a circular concerning a lottery. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and found the
statute to be constitutional on the grounds that "[t]he
power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the country. The
right to designate what shall be carried necessarily
involves the right to determine what shall be excluded."'" The Court noted, however, that "the object of Congress has not been to interfere with freedom of the press, or with any other rights of the
people; but to refuse its facilities for the distribution
of matter deemed injurious to the public morals."5 "
The Court reasoned that Congres merely was extending to circulars containing lotteries the same
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treatment extended to publications containing lewd
or obscene materials. 4
Even with the ban on mailing lottery information,
a loophole remained: advertisements of lotteries in
newspapers. The U.S. Attorney General determined
that because newspapers were not circulars, they
were outside of the ban's reach. 5 "I do not think
that a newspaper or periodical is rendered non-mailable by containing a lottery advertisement. This does
not transform the newspaper into a 'circular' within
the meaning" of the law, wrote Attorney General
Augustus H. Garland in 1885.5" The Louisiana lottery used the loophole for newspapers to reach citizens throughout the country. Ninety-three percent of
the lottery's income reportedly came from people living outside of Louisiana.57
With the Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, Congress
closed this loophole by banning from the mail newspapers containing lottery advertisements. 8 The ban
was challenged in Ex Parte Rapier.5 9 Rapier, president and general manager of the Mobile Daily and
Weekly Register in Alabama, was charged with violating U.S. Postal laws by publishing an advertisement for the Louisiana State Lottery Company in a
newspaper deposited in the U.S. mail.8 0 In a similar
petition, decided by the Court at the same time, a
Mr. Dupre was indicted in February 1891, for mailing a newspaper containing an advertisement for a
lottery.61
The convictions of both men were upheld by the

I

Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 40th Cong., Sess II,
15 Stat. 196 (1868).
,' Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335., 17 Stat. 283, 302 (1872)

(Rev. Stat. Sec. 3894) (an act to revise, consolidate and amend
the statutes relating to the post-office department).
Section 149 provided, in relevant part, "[tihat it shall not be

lawful to convey by mail, nor to deposit in a post-office to be
sent by mail, any letters or circulars concerning illegal lotteries,
so-called gift-concerts, or other similar enterprises offering
prizes, or concerning schemes devised and intended to deceive
and defraud the public for the purposes of obtaining money
under false pretenses . . . ." [sic] Id.
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 79, 17 Stat. 283, 294
(1872).
" Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, § 2, 19 Stat. 90 (1876)
(codified at REV. STAT. § 3894) (2d ed. 1878).
51 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
82
58
a4

Id. at 732.
Id. at 736.

Id.

See 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 306, 309 (1885).
Id.
57 21 CONG. REC. 8705-06 (1890) (Remarks of Rep.
Moore).
" Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, ch. 908, § 3894, 26 Stat. 465
(1890) (codified at REV. STAT. § 3894, (Supp. 2d ed. 1891) (to
'6

amend certain sections of the revised statutes relating to lotteries)). Section 3894 provided in relevant part:
No letter, postal card, or circular concerning any lottery,

so-called gift concert, or other similar enterprise offering
prizes dependent upon lot or chance, or concerning

schemes devised for the purpose of obtaining money or
property under false pretenses, and no list of the drawings
at any lottery or similar scheme, and no lottery ticket or
part thereof, and no check, draft, bill, money, postal note,
or money-order for the purchase of any ticket, tickets, or
part thereof, or of any share or any chance in any such
lottery or gift enterprise, shall be carried in the mail or
delivered at or through any post-office or branch thereof,

or by any letter carrier; nor shall any newspaper, circular,
pamphlet, or publication of any kind containing any advertisement of any lottery of gift enterprise of any kind
offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance, or containing any list of prizes awarded at the drawings of any such

lottery or gift enterprise, whether said list is of any part
or of all of the drawing, be carried in the mail or delivered by any postmaster or letter-carrier.
Id.
59

143 U.S. 110 (1892).

60

Id.

61

Id.
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Supreme Court, which found the earlier Jackson decision controlling:
It is not necessary that Congress should have the power to
deal with crime or immorality within the states in order to
maintain that it possesses the power to forbid the use of
the mails in aid of the perpetration of crime and immorality .... We cannot regard the right to operate a lottery as
a fundamental right infringed by the legislation in question; nor are we able to see that Congress can be held, in
its enactment, to have abridged the freedom of the press.
The circulation of newspapers is not prohibited, but the
government declines itself to become an agent in the circulation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to
the people.6"

Virtually foreclosed from advertising its lottery in
the U.S. and having lost its state charter, the privately-operated, state-sanctioned Louisiana lottery
moved its operation to Honduras." But the
"Serpent," as the Louisiana lottery came to be
called, survived." ' In response, Congress in 1895
banned the transportation of lottery-related materials, including tickets, in interstate and foreign commerce. 5 Section 4 of the statute gave postal workers
the authority to refuse to deliver any mail relating
to, or believed to relate to, lotteries." In 1890, postal
officials had been given the same authority with regard to registered mail, and were allowed to return
to senders any registered mail sent
to persons be67
lieved to be operating a lottery.
The first challenge to the 1895 law to reach the
Supreme Court was France v. United States."8 Messengers for a Kentucky-based lottery who solicited
bets in Ohio returned to Kentucky with papers containing the selected numbers, and then returned to
Ohio after the drawing each day with payoffs to the
winners and lists of winning numbers. The messen63

Id. at 134.

Blakey, supra note 38, at 941.
" Id. at 935.
66 Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 1, 53d Cong., Sess. III,
28 Stat. 963 (1895), U.S. COMP. STAT. 1901, 3178 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1301) (suppression of lottery traffic
through national and interstate commerce). Section 1 of the Act
stated, in relevant part:
That any person who shall cause to be brought within the
United States from abroad, for the purpose of disposing of
the same, or deposited in or carried by the mails of the
United States, or carried from one state to another in the
United States, any paper, certificate, or instrument purporting to be or represent a ticket, chance, share, or interest in or dependent upon the event of a lottery ... or shall
cause any advertisment of such lottery ... to be brought
into the United States, or deposited in or carried by the
mails of the United States, or transferred from one state to
another in the same, shall be punishable in the first of63

gers were arrested by federal agents as they returned
to Ohio and charged with violating the lottery ban. 9
In a narrow holding, the Supreme Court upheld the
statute but found the defendants not guilty. The ban
was construed as prospective in nature. It did not
prohibit the transportation of materials relating to a
drawing that had already taken place. "The lottery
had already been drawn; the papers carried by the
messengers were not then dependent upon the event
of any lottery ... .70
71
In a more celebrated case, Champion v. Ames,
the 1895 Act was challenged as exceeding Congress's
Commerce Clause power. The Court again upheld
the constitutionality of the statute. 72 Champion was
charged with engaging in a conspiracy to ship lottery
tickets from Texas to California for the monthly
drawing of the Pan-American Lottery Company,
based in Paraguay. 8 Champion claimed that the
carrying of the tickets, which had no real or substantial value in. and of themselves, was not commerce
among the states, and that Congress had no author74
ity to regulate such activity.
After determining that there was value to lottery
tickets in that carrying them from state to state constitutes commerce, and that the statute addressed and
banned this conduct, the Court was faced with the
question of whether an outright prohibition on shipping lottery tickets could be deemed regulation of interstate commerce. In upholding the prohibition as a
valid form of regulation, the Court referred to a case
decided several years earlier, in which the Court had
observed that the "suppression of nuisances injurious
to public health or morality is among the most im' '7
portant duties of government. 5
Experience has shown that the common forms of gam-

fense by imprisonment for not more than two years or by
a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or both, and
in the second and after offenses by such imprisonment
only.
Id. § 1.
" Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 4, 53d Cong., Sess. III,
28 Stat. 963 (1895) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1301

(1988)).
67
Blakey, supra note 38, at 935 n.45 (citation omitted), 939
n.57 (citing Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 2, 26 Stat. 465

(1890)).
164 U.S. 676 (1897).
69

Id.

70

Id. at 682.

71

188 U.S. 321 (1903).

72

Id.

7'

Id. at 323.
Id. at 353.

74

75

Id. at 356.
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bling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the widespread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons and places, but the
latter infests the whole community; it enters every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings
of the poor; it plunders the ignorant and simple."

The Court reiterated that Congress's power to
regulate commerce is bound only by limitations contained in the Constitution, and noted that Congress
was not seeking to legislate the internal affairs of a
state, but commerce among the several states.
As a state may, for the purpose of guarding the morals of
its own people, forbid all sales of lottery tickets within its
limits, so Congress, for the purpose of guarding the people
of the United States against the 'widespread pestilence of
lotteries' and to protect the commerce which concerns all
the states, may prohibit
the carrying of lottery tickets from
77
one state to another.

In Francis v. United States,7 a case decided concurrently with Champion, the Court reversed a
criminal conviction by narrowly construing the statute. In Francis, an Ohio lottery operator was convicted of conspiracy in connection with transporting
betting slips and other lottery related materials from
Kentucky to Ohio, in violation of Rev. Stat.
§ 5440.79 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes
said that the transportation involved was not the
same as mail, and did not constitute commerce because the betting slips passed from agent to agent,
but remained within the company's possession at all
times. Furthermore, the Court held that the agents'
records of what numbers bettors had chosen did not
"represent" the purchasers' chances of winning.80
Federal regulation of lotteries and the dissemination of lottery information thus stood firmly on the
Commerce Clause by the dawn of commercial radio
broadcasting early in the twentieth century. Neither
Id. at 356 (citing Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 163, 168
(1850), 12 L.Ed. 1030 (1850)).
7
Id. at 357.
78 188 U.S. 375 (1903).
79
Id. at 375-76 (citing Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 191, 28
Stat. 963).
8 Id. at 377, see also Blakey, supra note 38, at 944-45.
• Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912), repealed
78

by, Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 39, 44 Stat. 1162, 1174
(1927).
"' Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), repealed by, Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48
Stat. 1064, 1102 (1934).
88

ROBERT

W.

MCCHESNEY,

TELECOMMUNICATIONS,

MASS MEDIA & DEMOCRACY, THE BATTLE FOR THE CON-

TROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935, at 13 (1993).
" Id. at 14.

[Vol. 2

the Radio Act of 1912,1 nor the Radio Act of
1927,2 addressed lottery advertising. The 1912 Act
was "passed to coordinate point-to-point communication and did not anticipate the emergence of broadcasting.""6 It was unclear for some time whether a
viable broadcast industry would emerge. "There was
little sense that broadcasting could be profitable
throughout the 1920s.""4 Even if a viable industry
emerged, it was unclear how it would be financed.6
In fact, a contest was conducted by a trade publication in 1925 to determine the best method of supporting broadcasting. 6 AT&T's system of "toll"
broadcasting drew mixed results. Although its New
York station, WEAF, was "the first station to regularly sell airtime to commercial interests," AT&T
solicited listeners for direct donations in 1924.8 7 Not
until the early 1930s was it generally agreed that advertising would be the best way to finance the
industry. 6
Once it became clear that advertising would provide the financial support for the powerful new medium, lottery control provisions began to appear.
The radio industry adopted a Code of Fair Competition, which provided:
[N]o broadcaster or network shall knowingly permit the
broadcasting of, or information concerning any lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in
whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the
prizes drawn or awarded by means of such lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme whether said list contains any part
or all of such prizes.8"

The voluntary Code may have been an attempt to
head off the extension of the postal ban to radio advertising. It did not succeed. Broadcast of lottery information was forbidden by section 316 of the Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act").90 The
principal argument made in favor of including the
89 See WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW, § 32c
(1948). See generally, BARNOUW, THE SPONSER, NOTES ON A
MODERN POTENTATE (1977).

" McChesney, supra note 83, at 15.
87

Id. at 12-13, 15.

" Id. at 17, referring to Eric Barnouw. McChesney points
out that the debate over how the broadcast industry would be
financed raged for years before any decision was ultimately
made. He notes that not even Congress addressed the question of
whether the U.S. should have a "nationwide broadcasting system
financed by advertising." Id. His book provides an excellent discussion on the subject.
0 See Haley, The Broadcastingand Postal Lottery Statutes,
4 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, n.1 (1936) (referring to the Code of
Fair Competition, Art. VII, § 4(e), approved by President
Roosevelt on Nov. 27, 1933, Registry No. 1742-09).
90 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 316, 48 Stat.
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advertising ban in the 1934 Act, that broadcasters
should be subject to the same prohibitions as newspapers and should not be given an unfair advantage
over the print medium, was stated in committee
hearings leading to the Act's passage:
[T]he Committee does not think that the United States
should permit any radio station, licensed and regulated by
the Government, to engage in such unlawful practices.
Furthermore, the broadcast of such unlawful information
is unfair to the newspapers, which are forbidden to use
the mails, if they contain such information. 1

Although 18 U.S.C. § 1304 is a criminal statute,
no prosecution has been brought under this law."
The statute has been enforced solely through the
FCC's administrative processes. 98
B.

The Return of State-Conducted Lotteries

For more than a quarter century, the advertising
ban contained in section 1304 remained in effect and
unchallenged. Then, the underlying framework began to give way. In 1963, New Hampshire became
the first state in modern times to institute a state-run
lottery."" By 1975, several states had begun operating lotteries to raise money for government programs. Their actions forced Congress to act in order
to head off a threatened prosecution of these states.9"
Congress chose to accommodate the operation of legally authorized state-run lotteries consistent with
continued federal protection of the policies of nonlottery states.9 6
In 1975, Congress modified the ban on lottery ad1064, 1088 (1934). Section 316 was codified in 1948 under Title
18 of the U.S. Code at section 1304. See Pub. L. No. 772, ch.
645, § 1304, 62 Stat. 862, 866 (1948). See also 1948
U.S.C.C.A.N. A325, A582. For language of section 1304, see
supra note 1. Although the ban contained in the 1934 Act referred only to radio transmissions, the FCC interpreted "radio"
generically to include television broadcasting as well. In addition, section 1304 was amended in 1988 to conform to the FCC's
interpretation and pertains to all radio transmissions, including
television. See Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 10-625, § 3(a)(4), 102 Stat. 3206 (1988).
Current sections 312(b) and 503 of the 1934 Act grant the FCC
authority to bring administrative actions, including cease and desist orders, and forfeiture penalties, against persons who violate
18 U.S.C. § 1304. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(b), 503(b)(1), and
503(b)(2)(A) (1991).
91 S. REP. No. 1045 (which accompanied H.R. 7716), 72d
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1933).
" Blakey, supra note 38, at 946.
93 The FCC rule implementing section 1304 is found at 47
C.F.R. § 73.1211 (1992). See source cited supra note 3.
" Blakey, supra note 38, at 950 n.114, citing N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 284: 21-a to 21-t (1977).

vertisements to "permit the transportation, mailing,
and broadcasting of advertising, information, and
materials concerning lotteries authorized by law and
conducted by a state and for other purposes ....

-17

Title 18 of the U.S. Code was amended to add section 1307, which set forth exceptions to the bans
contained in sections 1301, 1302, 1303, and 1304."
Section 1307 permitted broadcasting by radio and
television of advertising, lists of prizes, or information concerning a state-conducted lottery by a broadcast station licensed to a location in a state conducting a lottery under authority of state law;
mailing of newspapers published in the state containing advertisements or information for state-sponsored lotteries; and transporting or mailing tickets
and other materials concerning a state-conducted lottery within the state to addresses within the state. 99
The exemption for advertising state lotteries was
quickly exploited and state-conducted lotteries proliferated. The institution of a lottery by the Commonwealth of Virginia illustrates this pattern. As noted
by the Supreme Court, Virginia "entered the marketplace vigorously. 1 00 On November 3, 1987, the
Virginia electorate approved a referendum to establish a state-operated lottery, create a State Lottery
Board, and appropriate the necessary funds.'0 1 The
lottery law became effective on December 1, 1987.
Even before lottery tickets became available, a
commercial radio station in northern Virginia sought
FCC approval to begin broadcasting advertisements
and information pertaining to lotteries sponsored by
Maryland and the District of Columbia.'0 2 Section
1307(a)(1)(A)(ii) permits a station licensed to an ad95 Id. at 952 (citing Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93583, 88 Stat. 1916 (1974)).

" See generally, H.R. REP. No. 1517, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7007.
" Pub. L. No. 93-583, 88 Stat. 1916 (1975), H.R. REP. No.
1517, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7007.
98 Id.; Act of Oct. 17, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-525, 90 Stat.
2748 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. 3005 (d)). The 1975
law also amended 18 U.S.C. § 1953(b) to exempt materials related to state conducted lotteries from the prohibition against interstate transportation of gambling paraphernalia. See Act of
Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-583, § 3, 88 Stat. 1916 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1953).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)-(d) (1988).
100 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,
2702 (1993). Virginia is authorized by law to sponsor a lottery,
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4001 (Michie 1987) and since 1988 has
conducted a series of lottery games.
10
See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4001 (Michie 1987).
10o
Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC, to Julian Shepard, Esq.,
(Dec. 28, 1987) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus).
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jacent state which conducts a lottery to broadcast advertisements for either state's lottery. Thus, the issue
before the FCC was whether passage of a law authorizing a Virginia lottery was equivalent to "conducting" a lottery. The FCC held that the enactment
of the law and the initial preparatory steps were insufficient to permit a finding that Virginia was conducting a lottery, where the appointees to the lottery
commission had not yet been sworn in and the commission had not yet been staffed. The FCC informed
the station that when Virginia actually commenced
lottery ticket sales and the state lottery commission
was better organized and staffed, the Commission's
position or view might be different.1 0 8
Once under way, the Virginia lottery developed
quickly. Promotion of the lottery was assisted by
Virginia's own version of Reno and Sparky; "Lady
Luck," who quickly became a sort of "legend." ' '
Lady Luck was a character garbed in a lacy, multilayered gown, covered with gold, silver, glitter and
sequins, and sceptered with a "star on a stick." She
appeared in a promotional calendar and in nine
commercials, and attracted enough of a following to
justify a "13-Day Lucky Tour," in which she made
local appearances throughout Virginia.
This local folk hero was at least partially respon103

Id.

See The Virginia Lottery Celebrates 5 Fabulous Years,
(The Virginia Lottery, 1993).
104

105

Id.

106

Id.

107 Id. at 5.

Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 732 F. Supp
633, 635 (E.D. Va. 1990), afl'd per curiam, 956 F.2d 263 (4th
Cir. 1992), rev'd, United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113
S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
Id.
lo
LIo Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988)).
... The relevant provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 2703 are as
follows:
Definitions
(6) The term "class I gaming" means social games
solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of
Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or
in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.
(7)(A) The term "class II gaming" means(i) the game of chance commonly known as bingo
(whether or not electronic computer, or other technologic
aids are used in connection therewith)(I) which is played for prizes, including monetary prizes, with cards bearing numbers or other
designations,
(II) in which the holder of the card covers such
numbers or designations when objects, similarly
numbered or designated, are drawn or electronically determined, and
10
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sible for the fact that, in five years, the lottery has
"emerged as one of the leading lotteries in the nation." 10 5 Since Virginia lottery tickets went on sale
September 20, 1988, players have purchased more
than 3.5 billion tickets and have won more than $1.7
billion in prizes.10 6 More than 5,600 retailers sell
Virginia lottery tickets. Licensed retailers include
convenience stores, service stations, supermarkets,
restaurants, and other retail outlets throughout the
10 7
state.
The Virginia lottery is heavily advertised. "In
1988, the Commonwealth paid $1,285,141 in advertising costs to the media. In 1989, the Virginia Lottery Board estimated that those expenditures would
reach in that year $2.3 million . .. 2 0o'In 1989, the

Lottery Board was spending nearly half of its advertising budget on television time.10 9
C.

Additional Exemptions From the Ban

Two laws passed in 1988 expanded the exemption
from the advertising ban that had been granted to
state-conducted lotteries. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") " ° provides a broad exemption
for Indian tribes. The Act distinguishes three classes
of games." Class I games involve tribal ceremonies
(III) in which the game is won by the first person covering a previously designated arrangement
of numbers or designations on such cards, including
(if played in the same location) pull-tabs, lotto,
punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other
games similar to bingo, and
(ii) card games that(I) are explicitly authorized by the laws of the
State, or
(II) are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of
the State, and are played at any location in the
State, but only if such card games are played in
conformity with those laws and regulations (if any)
of the State regarding hours or periods of operation
of such card games or limitations on wagers or put
sizes in such card games.
(B) The term "class II gaming" does not include(i) any banking card games, including baccarat, chemin
de fer, or blackjack (21), or
(ii) electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any
game of chance or slot machines of any kind
(C) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this paragraph, the term "class II gaming" includes those card
games played in the State of Michigan, the State of North
Dakota, the State of South Dakota, or the State of Washington, that are actually operated in such State by an indian tribe on or before May 1, 1988, but only to the extent of the nature and scope of the card games that were
actually operated by an Indian tribe in such State on or
before such date, as determined by the Chairman.
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of this para-
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or celebration-type gaming; Class II games include
bingo and card games; Class III games consist of casino gambling, including slot machines. In order for
a tribe to engage in Class III gaming, it must enter
into a compact with the state in which it is located
and the compact must be approved by the Secretary
of the Interior. Section 2720 of the Act exempts any
gaming conducted by an Indian tribe from the advertising ban imposed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301 and
1304. " 2 Section 2720's exemption for Indian gaming
has been incorporated into the FCC Rules, 1 8 as
were exemptions for state-conducted lotteries.
Interestingly, the question of whether the federal
provision allowing the broadcast advertising of In-

dian gaming preempts the laws of a non-gambling
state or a state that has no Indian gaming has not
been answered. In fact, to date, neither the FCC nor
the Indian Gaming Commission has issued an interpretation on this potential conflict. The legislative
graph, the term "class II gaming" includes, during the 1year period beginning on October 17, 1988, any gaming
described in subparagraph (B)(ii) that was legally operated on Indian lands on or before May 1, 1988, if the

Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the lands on which
such gaming was operated requests the State, by no later
than the date that is 30 days after October 17, 1988, to
negotiate a Tribal-State compact under section 2710(d)(3)
of this title.
(E) Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the term "class II gaming" includes, during the 1year period beginning December 17, 1991, any gaming
described in subparagraph (B)(ii) that was legally operated on Indian lands in the State of Wisconsin on or
before May 1, 1988, if the Indian tribe having jurisdiction
over the lands on which such gaming was operated requested the State, by no later than November 16, 1988, to
negotiate a Tribal-State compact under section 2701(d)(3)

Id.

of this title.
(F) If, during the 1-year period described in subparagraph (E), there is a final judicial determination that the
gaming described in subparagraph (E) is not legal as a
matter of State law, then such gaming on such Indian
land shall cease to operate on the date next following the
date of such judicial decision.
(8) The term "class III gaming " means all forms of
gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming.

*11

25 U.S.C. § 2720 (1988) states, "[d]issemination of In-

formation: Consistent with the requirements of this chapter, sections 1301, 1302, 1303 and 1304 of Title 18 shall not apply to

any gaming conducted by an Indian tribe pursuant to this
chapter."
113

47 C.F.R. § 73.1211(c)(3) (1992).
For example, language contained in IGRA's Statement

of Policy provides:
It is a long-and well-established principle of Federal-Indian law as expressed in the United States Constitution,
reflected in Federal statutes, and articulated in decisions

history is silent on this issue, but suggests at one
point that the federal law preempts any conflicting
state laws.114 Further, the National Association of
Broadcasters appears to have interpreted the federal
provision as preempting conflicting state laws.11
The Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act
of 1988 ("Charity Games Act")' created additional
exceptions to the advertising ban. This Act allows
the broadcast advertising of charitable lotteries; 1 7
governmental lotteries; 8 and promotional lotteries
.conducted by commercial organizations where the
lottery is incidental and ancillary to the primary business of the advertiser.1 9
The Charity Games Act expands the exemption
for state-conducted lotteries to permit broadcast advertising of any state lottery in any other state (regardless of adjacency to the state advertising the lottery) which conducts its own lottery 2 ' and
advertisements for betting on sporting events or conof the Supreme Court, that unless authorized by an act of
Congress, the jurisdiction of State governments and the
applications of state laws do not extend to Indian lands.
In modern times, even when Congress has enacted laws to
allow a limited application of State law on Indian lands,
the Congress has required the consent of tribal governments before State jurisdiction can be extended to tribal
lands.
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075, discussing Pub. L. No. 100-497
(1988); See also 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3076, in which the Statement of Policy provides: "S.555 is intended to expressly preempt
the field in the governance of gaming activities on Indian lands.
Consequently, Federal courts should not balance competing Federal, State and tribal interests to determine the extent to which
various gaming activities are allowed." Id.
,
1,5 See National Association of Broadcasters, Lotteries and
Contests, A Broadcasters Handbook, at 13 (3d ed. 1990), "[nlot
only is immediate (unless prohibited under state law) in-state
advertising of these games generally allowed, but cross-border
broadcasts (e.g., advertisements of Indian bingo conducted in one
State carried by stations in another) also now are allowed."
"'
Act of Nov. 7, 1988, Pub L. No. 100-625, 102 Stat. 3205
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988)).
117 Id. Provision codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2)(A)
(1988).
116 Id. Provision codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2)(A)
(1988). Another exemption to the advertising ban, created in
1950, allows broadcast advertising of fishing contests. See Act of
Aug. 16, 1950, ch. 722, § 1, 64 Stat. 451, amending Title 18 to
add section 1305, which states, "[t]he provisions of this chapter
shall not apply with respect to any fishing contest not conducted
for profit wherein prizes are awarded for the specie, size, weight,
or quality of fish caught by contestants in any bona fide fishing
or recreational event." Id. See also 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3010 for
legislative history.
110 Id. Provision codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2)(B)

(1988).

18 U.S.C.A. § 1307(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993) states:
The provisions of sections 1301, 1302, 1303 and 1304
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tests.1 1 In addition, in 1988 Congress amended the
postal laws to provide that materials or advertisements concerning lotteries, gift enterprises, or similar
activities can be mailed in any state so long as the
activity being advertised is legal in that state. 12 The
Act did not affect the existing ban on mailing lottery
paraphernalia or tickets in interstate commerce.1 28
Today it is legal to place advertisements for most
gambling and lotteries in newspapers, and to broadcast advertisements for state-sponsored lotteries,
charitable lotteries, and promotional lotteries incidental to the regular operations of a business, so long
as the activities are permissible under the laws of the
state in which the broadcast station is licensed. " " Indian gaming that is permitted under IGRA can be
advertised over the broadcast medium.12 ' Information can be mailed without fear of prosecution, pro-

vided the lottery is lawful in the state from which
the information is mailed."2 ' Only broadcast advertisements for non-exempt lotteries are still subject to
section 1304's ban.

shall not apply to ... (2) an advertisement, list of prizes,

which listeners at home could participate, prompted the FCC to
adopt an expansive definition of "consideration," designed to
prevent such programs, In re Promulgation of Rules Governing
Broadcast of Lottery Information, Report and Order, 43 F.C.C.
396 (1949). The Supreme Court struck down the rules as beyond the strict terms of the statute, FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284 (1954). Perhaps spurred by the impending advent of the modern state lottery, the FCC issued a
public notice in 1962 advising that the federal lottery statute
"makes no exception in favor of lotteries which may be legal
where conducted, as, for example, in the State of Nevada . .. ."
Broadcast of Lottery Information, Public Notice, 24 Rad. Reg.
(P & F) 478 (1962). The FCC's edict held fast, although certain
kinds of references to such lotteries were deemed not barred by
the statute, Broadcasting of Information Concerning Lotteries,

or other information concerning a lottery, gift enterprise

or similar scheme, other than one described in paragraph
(1), that is authorized or not otherwise prohibited by the

State in which it is conducted and which is (A) conducted
by a not-for-profit organization or a governmental organization; or (B) conducted as a promotional activity by a
commercial ,organization and is clearly occasional and ancillary to the primary businesses of that organization.

Id.

18 U.S.C. § 1307(d) states:
For the purposes of subsection (b) of this section "lottery"

121

means the pooling of proceeds derived from the sale of
tickets or chances and allotting those proceeds derived
from the sale of tickets or chances and allotting those pro-

III.
A.

CHALLENGES TO 18 U.S.C. § 1304
Early Doubts

As exemptions from the advertising ban multiplied, doubts as to the validity of the ban began to
arise. 2 ' In 1984, the FCC's General Counsel told
Congress that the amount of time the FCC devoted
to answering questions about the legality of broadcasting certain kinds of advertisements that might be
considered lotteries seemed inordinate to the evil the
statues sought to contain.12 8 In 1987, then Chairman

ceeds or parts thereof by chance to one or more chance

14 F.C.C.2d 707, para. 8 (1968), set aside and remanded, New

takers or ticket purchasers. "Lottery" does not include the
placing or accepting of bets or wager on sporting events or
contests. For purposes of this section, the term a "not-forprofit organization" means any organization that would
qualify as tax exempt under section 501 of the Internal

York State Broadcasters Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 414 F.2d
990 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970), on remand, 21 F.C.C.2d 846 (1970); In re Notification to George P.

Revenue Code of 1986.
See 39 U.S.C. § 3005(d) (1988). The Amendment to Ti-

222

tle 39 conformed the mailing statutes to the amendments made
by the Act to Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
128

(1988).
1"

See 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4343. See also 102 Stat. 3205
See

39

§ 1307(a)(1988).

U.S.C.

§ 3005(d)(1988),

18

U.S.C.

See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2704, 2720 (1988).
See 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1988). See also supra note 122
and accompanying text.
127 These doubts, however, followed 50 years of experience
under the 1934 Act, in which FCC enforcement of the lottery
ban was aggressive and expansive. In a 1936 license renewal
hearing, the FCC adopted the traditional definition of a lottery,
In re WRBL Radio Station, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 687, 690-1 (1936),
and thereafter investigation and enforcement of prohibited
broadcasts became an agency staple. See, e.g., FCC SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT/FISCAL YEAR 57 (1940), in which the FCC reported investigating 21 complaints involving "lottery programs."
The proliferation in the 1940s of radio giveaway shows, in
115
116

Mahoney, 45 F.C.C.2d 491 (1974). Generally, announcements

of places where lottery tickets can be purchased, where, how,
and when winning tickets were drawn, and the amounts of
prizes, continued to be prohibited. The Third Circuit reversed
an FCC determination that announcement of the winning lottery
number as part of a news broadcast would contravene the statute. New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United States, 491
F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), vacated as moot, 420 U.S.
371 (1975). State-conducted lotteries were subsequently exempted from the lottery statute. See supra notes 96-98.
11" Letter from Bruce E. Fein, General Counsel, FCC, to
Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
contained in Modernizing Federal Restrictions on Gaming Advertising: Committee on the Judiciary Report, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6-7 (1984).
It is our view that permitting the advertising of lotteries
legal in the states in which they are conducted would not
unleash fraudulent schemes on the public. Rather, it
would fill the fund-raising and marketing needs of entities
that deem games involving prize, chance and consideration
to be effective tools for legitimate purposes. It will also
permit the Commission staff to address more significant
matters.
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of the FCC, Dennis R. Patrick, testified before a
House subcommittee that:
The existing Section 1307 unnecessarily restricts the free
flow of information concerning legal activities (i.e., lotteries permitted by a State). Accordingly, the existing law
may be constitutionally infirm given the increased recognition of First Amendment protection accorded commercial
speech since the lottery provision was originally
enacted.1 '9

The hypocrisy of the ban was denounced by a
member of the newspaper publishing industry in
1984. Roy J. Eaton, then a member of the National
Newspaper Association, testified that:
[L]egal lotteries can be and are advertised in carrier-delivered newspapers and flyers which do not cross State lines,
church bulletins, billboards and other like media. The results of the statute is [sic] thus to foster an increase in
lottery advertising in these advertising vehicles and [to] arbitrarily discriminate against broadcasters . . .. o

Even the government agency responsible for prosecuting violations of section 1304, the U.S. Department of Justice, expressed skepticism as to the constitutionality of the ban. John C. Keeney, then
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division, testified that the Department had "serious
doubts [in light of Bigelow v. Virginia]'1 about the
ability of the Federal Government to enforce the
provisions of Chapter 61 of Title 18 as they apply to
advertisements of lotteries legal in the state in which
'
they are conducted." 182
B.

Edge Broadcasting v. United States

The first direct challenge to section 1304 came in
Edge Broadcasting v. United States.8 8 Edge BroadId.
Letter from Dennis R. Patrick, Chairman, FCC, to Hon.
Barney Frank, Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Law
and Government of the House Judiciary Committee (Nov. 3,
1987) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus) (emphasis added).
"" Advertising of Any State-Sponsored Lottery, Gift Enterprise or Similar Scheme: Hearings on H.R. Rep. No. 4020 and
H.R. Rep. No. 5097 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Law and Government Relations of the House Comm. on Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (June 14, 1984) (Testimony of
Roy J. Eaton, National Newspaper Association) [hereinafter
Subcommittee Hearings].
1 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
10
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 130, at 16-17 (testimony of John Keeney, Dep. Asst. Atty. Gen'l. Crim. Div.). In
Bigelow, the Supreme Court held that Virginia exceeded its police powers when it barred truthful advertising for abortion services in New York from being included in a newspaper pub129

casting was the licensee of Station WMYK-FM, a
station licensed to Elizabeth City, North Carolina,
which broadcast from a transmitter site only three
miles south of the border between Virginia and
North Carolina.1"" Approximately ninety-two percent of WMYK's potential listening audience resided
in Virginia, and ninety-five percent of its advertising
revenues came from sources in Virginia. 85 Approximately eight percent of those within WMYK's service area resided in North Carolina. 8 These potential listeners comprised less than two percent of the
population of North Carolina187

North Carolina did not sponsor a lottery and
made participation in the advertising of nonexempt
raffles and lotteries a criminal offense. 88 Because
North Carolina was a "non-lottery" state, the advertising ban exemption set forth in section 1307 did
not apply.13 9 Consequently, Edge was barred from
airing advertisements for the Virginia lottery by section 1304.1"0

Alleging that it had refrained from broadcasting
advertisement of the Virginia lottery out of fear of
criminal prosecution, and that it had consequently
lost millions in dollars in potential advertising revenue, Edge sought a declaratory ruling that, as applied to the facts of the case, sections 1304 and 1307
violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. 1 The lower courts agreed and held
sections 1304 and 1307 unconstitutional.""
In a decision released June 25, 1993, the Supreme
Court reversed. The principal question considered
was whether the advertisement ban abridged the
First Amendment protection given to "'commercial
speech." 1 "
In a series of cases culminating in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of
lished in Virginia Beach. 421 U.S. at 809.

M8 732 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1990).

184

18
116
187

Id. at 634.
Id. at 634-635.
Id. at 634.
Id.

138

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-219, 14-291 (1983).
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,
2701-02 (1993).
140
Id. at 2702.
139

141

Id.

The opinion was not published until after it had been
reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court found it "remarkable
and unusual" that a court of appeals would find it appropriate
141

not to publish a decision holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional. Id. at 2702 n.3.
143

Id. at 2703.
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New York, 14 4 the Supreme Court had articulated
guidelines concerning "expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience."

145

On the one hand, the Court found that

"commercial speech not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and
furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of information. "146 On the other hand,
the Court recognized a "common sense distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction,
which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation and other varieties of speech.

1' 4 7

To accord commercial speech its appropriate degree of protection, the Court fashioned a four-part
analysis. The threshold criterion is (1) whether the
speech at issue is misleading or related to unlawful
activity. If the speech is not false or misleading, the
government's power is more circumscribed. A restriction on the speech in question would be upheld
only if (2) the government could assert a substantial
interest to be achieved; (3) the restriction directly advanced the interest asserted; and (4) the regulation is
not more extensive than necessary to serve the
interest. 148
In Edge, the Court quickly zeroed in on the second and third criteria-the issue of whether the
challenged regulation directly advanced a substantial
governmental interest-and found that the courts below "asked the wrong question. 1 49 The validity of
the restriction was to be judged "not by the extent to
which it furthers the Government's interest in an individual case," but by "the relation it bears to the
general problem of accommodating the policies of
both lottery and non-lottery states."1 50 Congressional
policy of "balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery States" was directly advanced by applying the
statutory restriction to all stations in North Carolina,
even if as applied to one station such as Edge's,
"there were only marginal advancement of that interest."1'51 Moreover, the Court found the restriction,
as applied to WMYK, was not ineffective. By keeping lottery ads off WMYK, 127,000 people, eleven
percent of all radio listeners in the nine North Carolina counties WMYK reached, were not exposed to
144
145

116
147.
146
146

447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Id. at 561.
Id. at 561-562.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 566.
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,

2704 (1993).
160 Id. at 2705.
161 Id. at 2704.
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lottery advertisements. This result gave more than
speculative or marginal support to North Carolina's
anti-gambling policy.152 The Court, therefore, upheld the validity of section 1304 to the extent that it
prohibited a broadcast station in a non-lottery state
from airing ads for a lottery conducted by another
state.
C.

Valley Broadcasting v. United States

The second challenge to section 1304 arose while
Edge was pending before the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs, Valley Broadcasting Company, licensee of Station KVBC(TV), Las Vegas, and Sierra Broadcasting Company, licensee of KRNV(TV), Reno, asked
the Nevada federal district court to find that unless
section 1304 and related FCC regulations were construed so as to exclude casino gambling from the definition of lottery, Nevada broadcast stations would
be unconstitutionally barred from airing truthful advertisements about activities which were lawful
under Nevada law.158
The argument that a distinction could be made between "lotteries" and other forms of "gaming" was
based on both semantic and historical grounds. Semantically, plaintiffs argued that section 1304 literally applied only to a "lottery," "gift enterprise," or
"similar scheme," in which tickets were sold (or, in
the case of a gift enterprise, included in the purchase
price of merchandise or property) and winners were
selected by lot.'" Historically, plaintiffs argued, section 1304 grew out of attempts to control state lotteries. They noted that the Supreme Court had found
"the common forms of gambling are comparatively
innocuous when placed in contrast with the widespread pestilence of lotteries." 15
The district court gave short shrift to the attempt
to place casino games outside the definition of "lottery." Rather than parse semantic distinctions or
canvass the history of section 1304, the court merely
looked to precedent in which the Supreme Court had
defined a lottery as: (1) the distribution of prizes; (2)
according to chance; (3) for consideration.1" That
three-part definition was consistent with the definiId. at 2706.
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, appeal docketed, No. 93-16191, Brief for Appellees at 19 (9th Cir. 1993)
[hereinafter Valley Brief].
12
166

16

Id. at 11 n.2 (citing FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.,

Inc., 347 U.S. 284 (1953)).
166

Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 356 (1897) (citing

Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 163, 168, 12 L.Ed. 1030 (1850)).
"' FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284,
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tion contained in the FCC regulation.1 57 Casino
games clearly fell within such a definition, since they
are games of chance and involve the placing of bets
(consideration) in order to win a prize.
The definitional issue decided, the court moved on
to the issue of whether the ban on lottery advertisements violated the First Amendment. The government conceded that, to the extent the ads were protected as "commercial speech," the first prong of the
Central Hudson test was satisfied. " The advertisements at issue related to a lawful activity and could
be assumed not to be misleading. " ' The First
Amendment analysis was thus narrowed to the issues
of whether the government had a substantial interest
in banning the'broadcast of ads for a lawful lottery
and whether there was a sufficiently tight "fit" between that interest and the speech restrictions
imposed. 6
The sharpest disagreement was over the nature of
the government's two interests. The government asserted: (1) an interest in protecting states that did not
authorize casino gambling; and (2) an interest in
retarding the growth of private gambling and
thereby preventing the spread of organized crime. 61
Plaintiffs responded that the issue of whether gambling inevitably injured the health, safety and morals
of a community was an issue traditionally left to the
state, not the federal government, and that there was
no factual support for the assertion that legalized
gambling and organized crime were inevitably
linked 162 As the primary industry of Nevada, gambling was highly regulated. Not only were the owners of gaming operations rigorously scrutinized and
subject to state approval, but every key employee,
lender, and landlord, as well as non-gaming tenants
of every gaming establishment, was investigated by
and subject to the approval of State licensing
authorities."'
The district court rejected the government's for16 4
mulation of its interests on evidentiary grounds.
The court found that the government had not offered
,any specific evidence to support its contention that
289-91 (1953).
187
47 C.F.R. § 73.1211(a) (1993).
18
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 820 F. Supp.
519, 525 (D. Nev. 1993).
189

Id.

"I

Id. at 525-26.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 525-26.
See NEv. REv. STAT.

161
16

§§ 463.0129, 463.151-650; NEV.
1.55, 3.100, 3.110, 4.030, 5.070, 8.130,
15.530.1, 15.585.7-4, 25.020, 28.010-090 (Michie 1990).
16

GAM. COMM'N REGS.
1e4

820 F. Supp. at 525.

casinos licensed and heavily regulated by Nevada
were vehicles of organized crime; or that organized
crime was more attracted to private casino gaming
than to other forms of gaming for which advertisements were permitted. Although legalized gambling
undoubtedly involved social costs, these costs were
not unique to casino gambling, but were common to
all forms of gambling, including state lotteries, Indian casinos, horse racing and charitable gaming."
Arguments regarding the third prong of the Central Hudson test-whether the challenged restriction
"directly advanced" the governmental interest-echoed arguments regarding the second prong.
The government contended that section 1304 directly
advanced its interest in protecting states which did
not authorize lottery activities. Although Station
KRNV(TV) was licensed to Reno, Nevada, nineteen
percent of those who received its signal were citizens
of California. Similarly, four percent of those, who
received the signal of Las Vegas Station KVBC(TV)
were Utah residents. 66 Neither Utah nor California
permitted casino advertising. 67 The government thus
contended that the advertising ban on the Nevada
stations was necessary to protect the citizens of adjoining "non-lottery" states. 6
Although the district court recognized that television signals did not stop at state boundaries, it rejected the government's argument on two grounds.
First, the court found that the audience for the
plaintiff stations consisted "overwhelmingly of Nevada residents," and that "an extremely small percentage of California and Utah residents" could receive the signals of KVBC(TV) and KRNV(TV).1"
The court found it difficult to accept that commercials carried on Nevada stations posed any real danger to the public policies of California and Utah. In
addition, the court found that the advertising ban
only remotely advanced the government's federalism
interest, which the court defined as the duty to respect the policies of all states regarding gambling.
Accordingly, the advertising ban did not pass muster
I at 526.
Id.
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, appeal docketed, No. 93-16191, Brief for Appellants at 9-10, (9th Cir.
1993) [hereinafter Gov't Brief].
167

16

Id. at 9.

Id. at 19-21.
820 F. Supp. at 522. Citing the 1992 Statistical Abstract
of the United States, the court found that the population of Utah
was approximately 1,800,000, and that of California was
30,400,000. Approximately 13,200 Utah households received
KVBC(TV) and 37,200 California households received
KRNV(TV).
16
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under the third prong of the Central Hudson test.' °
For similar reasons, the court found that the categorical ban on lottery advertisements was not narrowly drawn to serve the government's legitimate interest in accommodating the lottery polices of
different states. A less restrictive alternative was
readily apparent, namely, a ban which would prohibit casino ads only in those states that prohibited
casino gaming. Consequently, under the fourth
prong of Central Hudson, a categorical ban on lottery advertisements was excessively restrictive, and
section 1304 was declared unconstitutional. 7 '
IV.

THE VALLEY APPEAL

The Supreme Court's Edge decision upholding the
validity of section 1304 undoubtedly affected the federal government's decision to appeal the district
court's Valley decision in which section 1304 was
declared unconstitutional. Although the principal
question in both cases was the applicability of the
four-part analysis set forth in Central Hudson, the
district court's decision in Valley involves a number
of issues not encompassed by the Central Hudson
analysis.
One of these issues is the nature of commercial
speech itself. In its appeal of Valley, the government
seeks to diminish the effect of the ban imposed by
section 1304 by minimizing the protection to which
broadcast lottery ads are entitled. Such ads, the government maintains, constitute commercial speech in
its "purest form,"' 7 2 and are merely a means
whereby advertisers could "reach the unreached and
persuade the unpersuaded.'

17

States that do not au-

thorize lotteries lack "the power to protect themselves and their citizens" from the solicitations of
74
broadcasts in states with more liberal lottery laws.1
Such a view of commercial speech is at odds with
the view of commercial speech adopted by the Supreme Court. 7 The Court has protected commercial speech not only because it expresses the economic interests of a commercial speaker, but because
it assists consumers and furthers the societal interest
in the fullest possible dissemination of informa170

Id.

171

Id.

1'
173
17

Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 15.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 20.

See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762-765 (1976); Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 377-378 (1977); Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New
178

tion. 17
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This view was recently reiterated by the Su-

preme Court in a case involving advertising for accounting services:
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and
information flourish. Some of the ideas and information
are vital, some of slight worth. But the general rule is that
the speaker and the audience not the government, assess
the value of the information presented. 1"

The starting point for an analysis of a restriction on
commercial speech is that the public has a right to
receive such speech rather than be "shielded" or "insulated" from it. 17 8 Even well-intentioned governmental restrictions on speech are suspect because
they substitute the government's paternalistic assessment of the information presented for that of the
speaker and the audience.
A second issue posed by Valley is whether a First
Amendment analysis of restrictions on commercial
speech can be circumvented altogether.1 7 9 The government maintains that the ban on lottery advertisements would be justified even if section 1304 "did
not satisfy the general Central Hudson test." 18 In
support of this proposition, the government cited the
Supreme Court's statement in Posadas de Puerto
Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. 8' that: "the Puerto Rican Legislature surely could have prohibited casino
gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico altogether.
In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power
to completely ban advertising of casino gambling." 8 '
Relying upon this language, the government argued
that because Congress "could have outlawed all lotteries," it necessarily had the power to ban the
broadcast of advertisements for lotteries, even in
states which authorize lotteries. 8
Acceptance of such a sweeping rationale would
have far-reaching implications for the protection of
commercial speech. Commercial speech is, by its nature, related to business activities which generally
are subject to federal regulation. The proposition advanced by the government would therefore essentially strip commercial speech of First Amendment
protection and permit commercial speech to be reguYork, 447 U.S. 557, 561-562 (1980).
176
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
117
Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993).
178
Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 32, 37, 40.
17I Id. at 41-42.
180 Id. at 42.
181 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
182 Id. at 345-46.
M Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 42.
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lated as completely as any form of interstate
commerce.
While many distinctions can be made between section 1304 and the advertising restriction at issue in
Posadas,8'" the key distinction is that the Court in
Posadas considered an active legislative attempt to
protect Puerto Rican citizens from exposure to gambling activities directed at tourists.' By contrast, in
Valley the federal government asserts a theoretical,
but unexercised power to ban advertisements for activities which a state has determined to be beneficial
to its economy. The statement that the government
"could have" outlawed the lotteries affected by section 1304, therefore, appears to be meaningless.
Having, in fact, deferred to the states to regulate lotteries, the federal government relies upon the existence of abstract legislative powers as a pretext for
avoiding the constitutional safeguards imposed on restrictions of protected speech.' 8'
The parties' sharply conflicting views of commercial speech and the role of state authority shape and
shade their application of the Central Hudson criteria. To the government, commercial speech is an insidious and ominous force. It constantly threatens to
inundate or infect an unsuspecting public. The
moral force of federal power shields and protects the
population from this force. State power is at best irrelevant, and at worst, a thrall of "organized crime."
By contrast, the plaintiffs view commercial speech as
a benign or beneficial force, a means of informing
economic and recreational decisions. State regulatory
and police powers are regarded as pragmatically sensitive to local and contemporary values, while federal
authority is draped in moralistic abstractions as outmoded as the Victorian rhetoric in which they are
expressed.
These conflicting attitudes are nowhere more evident than in the application of the second prong of
the Central Hudson analysis, the definition of a substantial governmental interest. 87 The government
asserts that lotteries are a "pestilence" and that section 1304 targets "the most dangerous and least socially redeeming" form of lottery, casino gam'" For example, the ban in Posadas specifically targeted
only those ads for casino gambling which would most directly
affect Puerto Rican citizens. The statute did not ban all broadcast ads, all lottery ads, or all ads for casino gambling; nor did it
restrict advertisements for "horse racing, cock fighting, 'picas' or
small games of chance at fiestas" which were "part of the Puerto
Rican's roots." Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342.
169 Id. at 477.
'
Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 23.
's' See supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.
1
Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 33.

bling;"'8 that the government's power to restrain the
"uniquely pernicious" social effects of lotteries remains unchanged from the Victorian times;1" 9 and
that the broad federal powers under the Commerce
Clause cannot be overridden by the "divergent assessment" of a particular state. 90 While states such
as Nevada are free to legalize gambling within their
borders, they have no right to "trump" federal policy
with respect to the advertising of those lotteries by
means of interstate commerce.191
Among the difficulties posed by these arguments is
a definitional one. Although the government claims
that section 1304 targets only "casino gambling" and
''commercial lotteries," neither the statute nor the
implementing regulations make such a distinction.
As construed by the district court, the term "lottery"
applies broadly to any activity in which the three elements of prize, chance, and consideration are present.192 Such a definition makes no distinction between a simple drawing, a bingo game, or a
traditional casino game such as poker or roulette.
The terms of the statute do not, as the government
claims, draw "rational distinctions between different
kinds of gambling,"1 ' nor target particular types of
gambling. Advertisements for any type of casino
gambling are permitted, provided that the gambling
is conducted by an exempt class of promoter, e.g., a
1 94
state or Indian tribe.
To the government, historical changes in the regulation of lotteries are irrelevant. The ban embodied
in section 1304 descends directly from Victorian precedent. Neither changing cultural attitudes, nor gutting of federal lottery laws affects section 1304's
moral or legal authority. It does not matter that the
nineteenth century statutes prohibiting the advertising of lotteries by mail either have been eliminated
or have fallen into disuse;' 9 5 that a majority of states
now conduct and advertise lotteries; that the provisions of section 1307 have been successively amended
to include an increasingly larger number of exceptions to the section 1304 advertising ban; or that the
sternly Victorian view of lotteries as a pernicious
pestilence has been overtaken by a more tolerant
189
190
191

Id. (citing Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)).
Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 23.
Id.

'9' Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 820 F. Supp.
519, 524 (D. Nev. 1993).
199 Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 33.
I" See 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988). See also 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1211(c) (1993).
1'
Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988)).
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view of lotteries as a profitable form of entertainment. The government scarcely acknowledges, far
from finding lotteries roundly condemned by state
governments, that the citizens of thirty-three states
and the District of Columbia are vigorously encouraged to engage in lotteries; that of the remaining
thirteen "non-lottery" states, at least five have recently considered or are actively considering establishing a lottery; 96 that casino gambling is conducted
by Indian tribes in approximately thirty-three
states; '7 that eight states authorize casino gambling;
four states authorize riverboat gambling; that fortythree states authorize pari-mutuel sports betting;1 8
and that only two states, Utah and Hawaii, prohibit
all forms of lotteries and pari-mutuel betting' 99
Given the federal government's de facto deferral to
the states on questions of gaming regulation, the increasingly tolerant gaming policies of the states, and
the multiple exceptions to the once comprehensive
federal ban on lottery advertisements, there is good
reason to question the government's assertion that it
has, in any except a highly theoretical sense, a substantial interest in banning the broadcast of lottery
advertisements in a state where such lotteries are
authorized.
Although the government relies heavily on Edge to
undermine the arguments raised in Valley, there is a
real question as to whether the governmental interest
affirmed in Edge can be reconciled with the governmental interest asserted in Valley. In Edge, the Supreme Court held that "[t]his congressional policy of
balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery
States is the substantial interest that satisfies Central
Hudson."' 0 0 The Court also stated that:
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of neutrality between states that prohibit casino gambling
and other commercial lotteries, on the one hand, and
states that encourage those forms of gambling, on the
other. Instead, Congress's goals were to reinforce the efforts of anti-lottery states, and to minimize the social costs
associated with commercial lotteries by discouraging public participation."0 '

The government attacks the Valley decision on the
ground that, by applying section 1304 narrowly to
the plaintiff's circumstances, the court had embraced
the very analysis rejected by the Supreme Court in
Edge.'0 According to the government, the Valley decision erroneously considered the question of
on
whether
banning
lottery
advertisements
KVBC(TV) and KRNV(TV) would directly advance the government's interest. The proper question
was not whether banning ads on these stations advanced a federal interest, but whether a universal
ban on ads for casino gambling on all broadcast stations was the "most effectual" means of protecting
20 4
"non-casino states and their residents."
The government's formulation of the question
shifts the focus from a factual inquiry into the actual
impact of lottery ads on citizens of California and
Utah to an abstract discussion of the federal government's authority under the Commerce Clause. According to this formulation of the issue, Nevada's lottery policies are "irrelevant." 2 05 The only relevant
issue is one of the federal government's power: "[tihe
point is not that congress is 'right' and Nevada is
'wrong,' but simply that the constitution vests congress, rather than Nevada, with the power to determine the interests to be pursued under the Com-

merce Clause."2 0 6
Instead of favoring either the lottery or non-lottery State,

Congress opted to support the antigambling policy of a
State like North Carolina by forbidding stations in such a
State from airing lottery advertising. At the same time it
sought not to unduly interfere with the policy of a lottery
sponsoring state such as Virginia. 1 '

In Valley, the government rejected all efforts to
"balance" the policies of differing states:
Congress never meant for section 1304 to adopt a position
1"
See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct.
2696, 2711 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

197
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Ex. 7G, Valley Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 820 F. Supp. 519 (D. Nev. 1993)
(CV-S-92-400-PMP(RJJ)). Exhibit 7, entitled "Gambling in
the United States," is based on a study conducted by the Nevada

State Gaming Control Board and was accepted as part of the

record in the Valley case.
198 Id. Ex. 7B:

The issue of power also shapes the government's
analysis of the reasonableness of section 1304's restriction on speech: "[C]ongress was free to conclude
that the most effectual means of discouraging participation in casino gambling is to prohibit broadcast
advertising of the activity altogether. Any regulatory
scheme that permits broadcast advertising of casino
gambling, however limited, would necessarily compromise Congress's legitimate goal of reducing pub199

Id. Ex. 7D.
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,
2704 (1993).
201
Id.
102
Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 30.
203
Id. at 34.
204
Id. at 39-40.
205
Id. at 23.
2nR
Id.
200
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lic demand." ' 7
In the government's view, the issue of the "fit" between a statutory goal and the resulting restriction
on speech is one to be answered in terms of effectiveness. A categorical ban on broadcast ads is justified
because such a restriction is the "most effectual"
means of discouraging public participation in
lotteries.
The government's abstract assertions can be tested
with a concrete question: Why may Lady Luck, but
not Reno and Sparky, promote lotteries in a state
where lotteries are legal? The legal context in which
the issues were examined provides a partial explanation. The Bonanza Casino ad was examined in the
context of a set of interpretive rules, which the FCC
has established by considering hundreds of lottery
advertisements. By contrast, the issues in Valley and
Edge arose out of a request for a declaratory ruling
as to the legality of section 1304. No specific ads
were at issue in either case. The issue presented was
purely one of whether section 1304 could be squared
with constitutional principles of law. This context
had a subtle but important effect on the tenor of both
cases. Would the government in Valley have so ringingly proclaimed lotteries a pernicious pestilence if
confronted with tail-wagging mutts in a red Cadillac, rather than "advertisements" in the abstract?
Could it have so confidently maintained that Reno
and Sparky-the father and son embodiment of
down-home family values-posed a pernicious threat
to the citizens of Utah or California? Would the
government have contended that viewers might resist
the frilly charms of Lady Luck, but still fall prey to
organized crime by joining Reno and Sparky down
at the Bonanza? The possibility of facing such questions at oral argument might have tempered the language of the parties and focused attention on questions more amenable to analysis than such
hypothetical questions of whether the government
"could have" outlawed state-regulated lotteries
altogether.
These ridiculous questions contain a serious issue,
however: Do radio and television audiences make
any clear distinction between ads which use Lady
Luck to promote lotteries and ads which feature
Reno and Sparky for the same purpose? Supreme
Court precedent generally condemns "discrimination
among different users of the same medium for ex-

pression."20 In one case, the Supreme Court considered an Illinois statute that banned pickets or demonstrations within 150 feet of school buildings, but
exempted peaceful picketing of any school involved
in a labor dispute.2 9 In a subsequent case,210 the
Court considered a similar statute that barred all
residential picketing, but allowed peaceful pickets of
places of employment involved in labor disputes.
Both statutes were struck down on grounds that they
discriminated between lawful and unlawful conduct
based upon the content of the communication.
Although cloaked in "the guise of preserving residential privacy," the ban in the later case exempted
labor picketing on the grounds that it was just as
21 1
likely to intrude on the tranquility of the home.
The government defended the statute as an attempt
to "balance" the privacy rights of the homeowner
with the rights of employees to express their views,
but the Court found that such a balance included a
fatal presumption: "the desire to favor one form of
speech over all others.2' 2
Section 1304 is similarly flawed. Although the
government defends section 1304 as an attempt to
"strike a balance" between the promotion of certain
lotteries and the discouragement of public, participation in lotteries,2" such a balance contains the same
flaw identified in the picketing cases: it favors one
form of speech-lottery advertisements by a favored
class of advertisers-over all others. States, governmental entities, Indian tribes, nonprofit organizations, and commercial entities that do not regularly
conduct lotteries may use the broadcast medium to
advertise their lotteries.2 1 4 Other advertisers may not.

For example, pursuant to the exceptions set forth
in section 1307, advertisements may be broadcast for
a casino game conducted under the auspices of a
North Dakota charity, but not for an identical game
lawfully conducted by a Las Vegas casino. Advertisements may be broadcast for the use of slot machines lawfully operated by an Indian tribe, but not
for slot machines lawfully operated by a Nevada
casino.
The discrimination apparent in these two examples would be even more obvious if the charity or
Indian tribe contractually delegated the management
and operation of the gaming activity to a professional
gaming company.21 In such a case, section 1304
would permit or bar the broadcast of advertisements
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depending solely upon the legal form of the speaker.
Advertisements for the same game conducted by the
same operator might or might not be broadcast, depending solely on such formal distinctions as the
public or private, tribal or corporate, for-profit or
not-for-profit status of the speaker.
In legal terms, these distinctions impose "a selective restriction on expressive conduct far 'greater

than is essential to the furtherance of [a substantial

U.S.C. §§ 2711-2712.
216
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 455

(1972).

governmental] interest.'

"16

In practical terms, the

distinctions are simply incomprehensible. They cannot be understood by the ordinary listener or viewer
who tunes in to a thirty second television ad.
Perhaps, after all, there is no good answer to the
question why Lady Luck may speak when Sparky
may not bark.

